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Abstract—The integration of a fuzzy system and automaton theory can form the concept of fuzzy automaton. This integration allows 
a discretely defined state-machine to act on continuous universes and handle uncertainty in applications like Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS). The typical IDS detection mechanisms are targeted to detect and prevent single-stage attacks. These types of attacks 
can be detected using either a common convincing threshold or by pre-defined rules. However, attack techniques have changed in 
recent years. Currently, the largest proportion of attacks performed, are multi-step attacks. The goal of this paper is to introduce a 
novel detection mechanism for multi-step attacks built upon Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (FRI) based fuzzy automaton. In that respect, 
the FRI method instruments the fuzzy automaton to be able to act on a not fully defined state transition rule-base, by offering 
interpolated conclusion even for situations which are not explicitly defined. In the suggested model, the intrusion definition state 
transition rule-base is defined using an open source fuzzy declarative language. On the multi-step attack benchmark dataset 
introduced in this paper, the proposed detection mechanism was able to achieve 97.836% detection rate.  Furthermore, in the studied 
examples, the suggested method was able not only to detect but also early detect the multi-step attack in stages, where the planned 
attack is not fully elaborated and hence less harmful. According to these results, the IDS built upon the FRI based fuzzy automaton 
could be a useful device for detecting multi-step attacks, even in cases when the intrusion state transition rule-based is incomplete. 
The early detection of multi-step attacks also allows the administrator to take the necessary actions in time, to mitigate the potential 
threats. 




Nowadays, network administrators face stressful 
environments with an overload of network traffics. These 
traffics need to be analyzed and investigated to detect 
abnormalities. The IDS has benefitted from the rapid growth 
of technology; however, intruder techniques have also 
adapted to the IDS detection mechanisms’ new technological 
developments. Intruders have continued to advance their 
techniques and alter their behaviors to avoid detection by 
recent detection mechanisms. As a result, the danger of 
attacks has become increasingly more challenging to combat. 
Computer and network security systems face different 
types of sophisticated attacks. One sophisticated kind of 
attack is the multi-step attack. The multi-step attack [1], [2] 
is an attack composed of several prerequisite steps leading 
up to the final step which launches an attack targeting the 
victim’s security hole. The attackers follow this technique to 
avoid detection. The prerequisite steps resemble normal 
behavior and serve as a subterfuge to facilitate execution of 
the final step of the attack. As detailed in the security report 
of Chinese network security organization [2], two types of 
multi-step attacks (denial of service and warms) recorded 
60% of the total number of attacks around the world. As a 
result, multi-step attacks have become a constant challenge 
for both users and organizations. In 2017, the Kaspersky 
global security report [3] revealed that 91% of enterprise 
businesses are affected by these types of sophisticated 
attacks, the largest proportion of which are Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks. The well-known types of multi-step attacks 
such as DoS Mstream, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) bounce 
and DoS Domain Name Server (DNS) were executed based 
on a sequence of prerequisite steps [4]. 
The multi-step attack is a constant challenge for the IDS 
because intruders may implement complex attack scenarios, 
composed of several prerequisite steps, all aimed at 
executing their final attack [5]. Often, there is a causal 
relationship between the attack steps and forecasting the next 
step of attack [6]. There is an increasing need to design and 
implement an efficient IDS detection mechanism capable of 
handling different attack scenarios. The IDS systems are 
categorized based either on their monitoring techniques or 
their detection methodologies [7], [8]. In terms of 
monitoring techniques, the IDS system can be categorized as 
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a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) which 
operates to monitor and detect intrusions within all network 
devices. Also, IDS comprises a Host Intrusion Detection 
System (HIDS) which works to protect a specific device 
within the network. 
From another perspective, the IDS systems could also be 
categorized based on their detection methodologies either as 
anomaly-based IDSs or signature-based IDSs [9]. The 
anomaly-based IDS detects intrusions based on the normal 
historical behavior of a specific network. It compares the 
real-time network traffics with the normal historical 
behavior to detect for abnormalities. The signature-based 
IDS verifies the current packet pattern (sequence series of 
packets) by comparing it with the pre-defined, stored 
intrusions patterns. 
The IDSs face several challenges including being able to 
detect multi-step attacks and the boundary problem 
(applying the binary decisions in the detection mechanism) 
[10]. In terms of the multi-step attacks, there is a causal 
relationship between the prerequisite steps which allows for 
administrators to be able to predict the next step of the attack 
[6]. Therefore, the multi-step attacks consist of different 
preliminary phases which can be distinguished from one 
another. On the other hand, implementing an efficient 
detection mechanism is also challenged by the boundary 
problem because there are no clear boundaries and no 
convincing threshold for defining normal and intrusion 
traffics [11]. The fuzzy system extends the binary decision to 
the continuous space, smoothing the boundaries and offering 
a solution to the boundary problem. Additionally, the results 
generated by the fuzzy systems are more comprehensible 
[10]. 
This work proposes a novel detection mechanism for the 
multi-step attack. The proposed detection mechanism was 
able to detect the multi-step attack even within the early 
stages of the attack. Furthermore, it could extend the binary 
decision to continuous space. The proposed detection 
mechanism was performed using the fuzzy automaton. The 
fuzzy automaton derives its strength from two paradigms: 
the theory of automata and the fuzzy system. The reasoning 
part of the proposed detection mechanism adopts the FRI 
method instead of classical reasoning methods. This is done 
to decrease the total number of fuzzy rules required to define 
the state transition rule-base (simplification) and to offer 
interpolated results, even when the knowledge representation 
is not complete. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section (II) 
describes the different types of multi-step attacks and 
classifies them, in detail, based on their implementation 
scenarios. It also explains how the intrusion detection 
mechanisms (finite state machine and hidden Markov 
models) can be used to detect for multi-step attacks. These 
studies are then evaluated and followed by a discussion 
section to present some recent gaps in these methods. 
Subsection (II-H) details the design and structure of the 
proposed FRI based fuzzy automaton model. The results and 
discussion presented in section (III). Finally, section (IV) 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
This section presents some different types of the well-
known multi-step attacks for clarifying the sequence steps 
for those types of attack. It also shortly describes the main 
prerequisite steps, characteristics and events structure of the 
multi-step attacks. 
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Mstream 
DoS attacks are considered one of the most harmful types 
of attack. They directly affect the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of network services. This attack aims to 
prevent several network and computer services [10]. The 
attackers perform several techniques to disrupt services such 
as consuming resources (network bandwidth, CPU, memory 
utilization, etc.). Any consumption of these resources 
increases the system overload and, after a while, the service 
slows down or becomes unavailable for end users [8]. At the 
early stages of the DoS-Mstream attack, attackers attempt to 
perform a sequence of prerequisite steps to launch their final 
goal. The DoS-Mstream attack has five prerequisite steps 
[12] to reach the desired goal successfully. This sequence of 
steps is summarized as follows: 
• The attacker executes one of the probe tools (i.e., IP 
sweep), these tools are used to discover and collect 
some required information such as live IP addresses, 
operating system version, services, and opening ports. 
• From the collected live IP addresses, the attacker 
searches for the hosts that had enabled the service of 
“sadmind” using “ping” command options. 
• As a result, the attacker can generate a list of intended 
victims. The attacker collects the victims to implement 
the root access login using Remote SHell (RSH) access 
script. This step aims to give the attacker permission 
over the victims' systems. 
• DoS-Mstream installation begins by infecting victims 
with the root access login shell. 




Fig. 1  The Sequence Events of The DoS-Mstream Attack 
 
As a result of the executed DoS-Mstream multi-step 
attack, the system service is disrupted, and the protected data 
are exposed to illegal access. Attackers do not typically 
launch their attacks blindly. They begin their attacks with 
legal steps set up to uncover host information, services, etc. 
After, they execute the remaining steps of the attack. It is 
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worth mentioning that these probe tools are designed for 
authorized users to discover and troubleshoot network and 
computer devices. However, attackers exploit these tools to 
execute their attacks. Fig.1 presents the event sequence of 
the DoS-Mstream multi-step attack. 
B. File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Bounce 
The FTP bounce multi-step attack is executed by 
exploiting weaknesses in the FTP protocol. The standard 
FTP specifications include features that could be exploited 
by attackers. The main purpose of the FTP bounce attack is 
to transfer prohibited data within network ports [13]. The 
attackers exploit the FTP server’s passive mode to illegally 
send and receive data within network ports. In the FTP 
server’s passive mode, the trusted client initiates the 
commands and data sessions. The attackers exploit the 
initiated sessions to launch a Remote SHell (RSH) message 
against the FTP server which possesses a trusted client 
record [14]. 
According to [13], [14], the FTP bounce multi-step attack 
is carried out as follows: 
• The attacker uses one of the vulnerability tools to 
uncover and collect some required information such as 
the server’s live IP addresses, the FTP server version, 
opening ports and services. 
• The attacker prepares a list of vulnerable victims that 
are running a RSH shell. 
• The attacker uploads the malicious file to the infected 
victims now running the RSH shell and uses the port 
commands to initiate the data transfer. 
• If the previous step is completed successfully, the 
attacker then forwards the FTP server output to the 
RSH shell port. 
• The infected victim accepts the forwarded files and the 
attacker begins executing them as a sequence of 
commands. 




Fig. 2 The Sequence of Events of the FTP-Bounce Attack 
 
C. DoS on Domain Name Server (DNS) 
Internet service has been available now in different 
application areas. It serves several applications such as bank 
transactions, mail systems, social networks and more. 
Website services are also targeted by security threats, 
leading users to be concerned about service availability and 
access to their personal information. 
The DNS service is considered a critical component of 
internet infrastructure. It consists of the formal database of 
the public IP addresses and their hostnames. It also offers 
official mapping between the IP addresses and domain 
names [4]. Attackers execute the DoS-DNS multi-step attack 
by exploiting security weaknesses. This attack aims to 
prevent the DNS server services from being reached by end 
users. The DoS-DNS multi-step attack [15] is implemented 
as follows: 
• The attacker defines the expected DNS victim by using 
the nslookup which is a legal command that could be 
used by the authorized administrator. The output of the 
nslookup command is the current valid DNS server. 
• The attacker verifies the primary active DNS server by 
using the ping command. 
• The attacker initiates the DNS probe tools to define the 
DNS version, opening ports and the current running 
services. 
• The attacker executes the DoS-DNS attack scripts such 
as WinNuke [15] or HyenaeFE [16]. 




Fig.3 The Sequence of Events of the DOS-DNS Attack 
 
Multi-step attacks pose a constant challenge for protecting 
the network and computer resources. The typical IDS 
detection mechanism effectively detects low-level attacks 
(single-stage attacks used to obtain the target). These types 
of attacks can be detected using either a common convincing 
threshold or based on pre-defined rules [17]. On the other 
hand, the multi-step attack performs several prerequisite 
steps leading up to the execution of the final step. It has 
different, distinguishable preliminary phases. The state 
machine detection mechanisms effectively detect the multi-
step attacks [12], [18], [19]. 
D. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) Against Multi-Step 
Attacks 
HMMs [20] are implemented based on the probabilistic 
finite state machine to generate a predictive model for the 
sequence of events. The HMMs consist of two parts: 
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observable events and hidden states. The probabilistic 
models can be implemented in several domain problems 
such as IDS, signal processing, pattern recognition and more. 
Typically, effective HMMs depend on two fundamental 
steps [21]: 
• Full understanding of the domain problem to 
characterize the possible events. 
• Parameter optimization (there are different tuning 
algorithms implemented with HMMs such as Genetic 
Algorithms (GA) and Baum-Welch (BW) algorithm. 
In [22], Shrijit et al. use the HMMs to implement an 
approach for detecting DoS multi-step attacks. The 
mathematical model of the urn and ball was implemented to 
extract the required events. The expected observations were 
defined as source bytes, destination bytes, duration, host 
login, and guest login. HMM parameters were tuned using 
the standard BW algorithm. The simulation environment 
shows that the proposed HMM approach obtained a 79 % 
detection rate. The work of Zhang et al. in [2] introduces two 
different HMMs for detecting the multi-step attacks. The 
first HMM model was implemented and optimized using the 
BW algorithm. The second HMM model was designed and 
implemented without a training and optimization phase. The 
two proposed models were tested and evaluated using the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
multi-step attacks dataset [23]. The results obtained reflected 
that the optimized HMM model effectively decreased the 
false positive alerts. Meanwhile, it outperformed the 
untrained HMM model in the detection and prediction of 
multi-step attacks. 
There are other hybrid HMM solutions too. Devarakonda 
et al., in [24], propose a model to detect multi-step attacks 
based on HMMs and Bayesian network. The proposed 
hybrid model was divided into two phases. In the first phase, 
the Bayesian network algorithm was used to extract the 
required HMM states from the Knowledge Discovery 
Databases (KDD99) [25]. The second phase was performed 
based on the extracted states’ transition of the Bayesian 
network algorithm. The validation process for the proposed 
hybrid model reflects that the model detected the multi-step 
attacks with a high detection rate. In [26], Aneetha et al. 
propose the use of a hybrid model of clustering algorithm 
and a HMM for detecting the multi-step attacks. The 
proposed probabilistic model was divided into two parts. 
The first part was performed to define the states, based on a 
clustering algorithm. The extracted states were forwarded to 
the second part of the proposed probabilistic model. In the 
second part, the state transitions probability matrix was 
generated with the initial distribution matrix. The proposed 
hybrid probabilistic model detected the multi-step attack 
even within the early stages of the attack and achieved a 
95% detection rate. 
The work of Devarakonda et al. in [27] focuses on 
detecting and preventing the multi-step attack at its onset 
(before it poses a severe risk). The proposed detection 
approach was adapted using a hybrid HMM. The Bayesian 
network algorithm was used to extract the system states. The 
proposed approach was optimized using the BW algorithm. 
The Bayesian network algorithm generated the state 
transition tables for both the normal and multi-step attacks. 
The simulated environment (DARPA dataset) reflected that 
the proposed approach could detect the multi-step attack 
within the DARPA dataset even within the early stages of 
the attack. The system states are essential for implementing 
the HMMs as a detection mechanism. According to [22] and 
[26]-[28], the system states could be determined using 
various methods including the Bayesian network, clustering 
algorithms, and Non-Nested Generalized Exemplars 
(NNGE). 
E. Deterministic Finite State Machine (DFSM) Against 
MultiStep Attacks 
At present, research has been conducted to implement the 
DFSM as a mechanism for detecting multi-step attacks. The 
DFSM [29] is a computational model of system behavior 
that has a restricted number of states. In other words, those 
systems that have states which could be represented as 
disjoint sets. The beneficial effect of additions the DFSM 
against multi-step attacks is to detect the multi-step attacks 
in the levels of the stage (before they posed a harmful step). 
The DFSM had the following properties [29], [30]: 
• The DFSM could be visualized graphically and easily 
tested. 
• The system states changes from the current state to 
the next state based on the current state-transition. 
• The events and conditions caused the state-transitions 
between the predefined system states. 
• The system could not be in more than one state at the 
same time. 
The general form of the DFSM [31] can be described by a 
5-tuple expressed in Equation 1. 
 
 ),,,,( 0 FqQM δΣ=  (1) 
 
Where Q presents the set of finite system states, Σ shows 
the alphabet system inputs, δ presents the predefined 
transitions function, q0 shows the initial system state and F 
indicates the final or accepted system state. 
Branch et al., in [19], propose an approach to detect the 
DoS multi-step attack based on the DFSM. The time 
intervals between specific alert correlations were used to 
enhance the accuracy rate of the DFSM. The multi-step 
attack's signature (pattern) was defined as a sequence of 
events. The proposed detection approach’s general structure 
includes several important procedures such as data filtration, 
event generators, and rule generators. The final state of the 
proposed detection approach indicates if the DoS multi-step 
attack has been completed, or not. The proposed approach 
was tested and evaluated using the DARPA dataset which is 
a benchmark dataset for different multi-step attack scenarios. 
The proposed DFSM approach was able to detect the DoS 
multi-step attack within the DARPA dataset successfully. 
The work of Sekar et al., in [32], focuses on detecting the 
multi-step attack based on the system call parameters. The 
system call parameters were used as the proposed approach’s 
input parameters. These parameters were extracted using the 
Program Counter (PC) function. The normal behavior was 
defined as a sequence pattern of system call parameters. The 
PC function's system call parameters were adapted as states. 
The system call parameters were chosen to move the system 
from the current state to the next state. The proposed 
approach follows any sequence of system call parameters 
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which did not follow the predefined standard normal 
behavior. The simulated environment indicates that the 
proposed detection approach works well to detect the multi-
step attack. There are other works adapted to the normal 
behavior pattern to detect the multi-step attacks.  
Treurniet et al., in [33], study the simulated network 
profile’s normal behavior to detect the multi-step attack, 
implementing the DFSM as a detection model. The proposed 
model was applied to monitor any new transitions or events 
which did not follow the predefined pattern of normal 
behavior. It operates the TCP flags as input parameters to 
move the system from the current state to the next system 
state based on predefined rules. The proposed detection 
model was tested and evaluated based on the benchmark 
DARPA dataset, “week1”. Subsequently, the proposed 
DFSM model successfully detected the abnormality 
connections that were not following the patterns of normal 
behavior. 
There are other hybrid DFSM solutions too. The work of 
Han et al., in [34], proposed a hybrid model for detecting 
multi-step attacks called the “Adaptive Time-dependent 
Finite Automata” (ATFA). The general structure of ATFA 
was implemented based on the time-dependent finite 
automata. The ATFA model consists of two phases. In the 
first phase, the time series of the network profile are 
analyzed to define the normal and abnormal patterns 
(training phase). In the second phase, the Hsiaos sequential 
approach is applied to determine the causal relationship 
between the series of packets. The Hsiaos sequential 
approach was used to define the sequence series of packages 
which appeared as a multi-step attack. The ATFA model was 
tested and evaluated using the DARPA benchmark dataset 
and was found to work well for detecting multi-step attacks 
within the simulated environment. 
Branch et al., in [19], continue the work of Vigna et al., in 
[35], which proposed the STAT model as a detection 
mechanism. Branch et al. then extend their work to include 
the NeSTAT model which was adapted to be used with the 
DFSM as a detection mechanism. This extension aims to 
define the different types of multi-step attacks as state 
transition scenarios. This extension defines the different 
types of multi-step attacks as state transition scenarios. The 
proposed detection model assumes that the initial system 
state is the normal state. The abnormality patterns are then 
defined as a sequence of actions. These actions are 
responsible for moving the system from a normal state to a 
compromised state. The authors applied the formal models 
of the attacks’ scenarios as state transition diagrams.  Thus, 
in the early stage of NeSTAT model (analyzer stage), the 
attack scenario should be extracted in its precise order. In the 
analyzer stage, the DoS multi-step attack, UDP/TCP 
spoofing and remote buffer overflows have been defined and 
illustrated as state transition scenarios. The NeSTAT was 
able to detect the previously discussed types of multi-step 
attacks. 
Some other works applied the DFSM against the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) flooding attack. 
Gemona et al., in [36], focus on detecting the TCP flooding 
attack which is a type of DoS attack. The TCP flood attack’s 
sequence of events was implemented on the proposed DFSM 
model. The proposed DFSM model acts as a passive 
monitoring system for the TCP packets. The model consisted 
of three parts: monitoring, modeling, and detection. The 
modeling part was performed by determining the 
connections and defining the system states (SYN/ACK, 
SYN/Received, and ACK). Meanwhile the detection part 
determined a large number of SYN/Received states. The 
results showed that the DFSM model was able to detect the 
TCP flooding attack within the simulated test-bed 
environment. 
F. Discussions 
The works mentioned above provide convincing 
contributions and show support for the persistent need to 
detect and predict multi-step attacks at their onset before 
they pose a serious harm. However, the previous works 
share some common disadvantages, summarized as follows: 
• Their detection mechanisms applied the binary 
decision which supports the boundary problem, a 
constant challenge for implementing an efficient IDS 
detection mechanism [10], [11]. Herein, there are no 
clear boundaries between normal and intrusion 
traffics. 
• The studied detection mechanisms did not determine 
the level of degree of system states; they only applied 
a binary decision to recognize the system state and to 
define the normal and intrusion traffic. 
• They adapt a large amount of expert knowledge either 
for defining the complete attack scenarios or for 
defining the pre and post conditions in a precise order. 
• The system could not be in more than one state at the 
same time while using the DFSM [29], [30]. 
Therefore, the detection mechanism could only 
follow a single path of event change state. 
In response to the previous issues, this paper introduces a 
novel mechanism for detecting multi-step attacks by the 
application of the FRI based fuzzy automaton. The reasons 
for using the fuzzy automaton and the FRI based reasoning 
are summarized as follows: 
• The integration of a fuzzy system and automaton 
theory can form the concept of fuzzy automaton. This 
integration allows a discretely defined state-machine 
to act on continuous universes. 
• The fuzzy system effectively smooth the boundary 
between normal and intrusion traffics, effectively 
avoiding the binary decision. 
• The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism presents 
the system states as a vector of membership values 
allowing the system to be in more than one state at 
the same time. As a result, the fuzzy automaton could 
follow multi-paths of intrusion-state changes. 
• The proposed detection mechanism adapts the FRI 
based reasoning instead of using classical inference 
methods. This simplifies rule definition because the 
missing state transition rules are interpolated by the 
reasoning (FRI) mechanism. In other words, the FRI 
reasoning mechanism can produce results even when 
some situations are not explicitly defined in the fuzzy 
rule-based knowledge representation. 
• The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism did not 
involve a large knowledge base. Herein, there is no 
need to define the pre and post conditions of the 
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attack scenario in a precise order. The fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism directly predicts the 
most plausible intrusion goal by utilizing the 
available history data. 
G. Fuzzy Automaton Detection Mechanism 
This subsection presents the full architecture of the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism and discusses its main 
functions and interactions.  
Automata theory [37] is defined as the analytical study of 
abstract systems to solve computational problems. The 
integration between the fuzzy system and automaton theory 
results in a fuzzy automaton. This incorporation offers the 
ability to handle the computational challenges for both 
discrete and continuous spaces. The fuzzy automaton 
implemented based on the strengths of two paradigms, the 
automat, and the fuzzy system. Fuzzy systems are being 
implemented more frequently in different application areas. 
Fuzzy systems present comprehensive approximate 
reasoning results for the system’s computational problems. 
Furthermore, they provide the required extension of the 
binary decision problem to the continuous truth value [10]. 
The general definition of the fuzzy automaton [38] is 
presented as a 6-tuple, illustrated in Equation 2. 
 
 ),,,,,( ωδ ZRQF Σ=  (2) 
 
Where Q is the finite set of the system states, 
Q={q0,q1,...,qk}. Σ is the finite set of the input symbols, Σ = 
{x0,x1,...,xn}. δ is the fuzzy transition function; it is used to 
map the current system state to the next system state based 
on the finite set of inputs, δ: Q × Σ × Q → (0,1]. R shows 
the initial system state F, Re ∈ Q. Z presents the finite set of 
output, Z = {Z0, Z1,..., Zk}. Finally, ω presents the output 
mapping function which is responsible for mapping the 
fuzzy states into the output set, ω: Q × Σ → Z. 
 
In the fuzzy automaton, the system states, inputs and 
outputs are all presented as fuzzy sets. The predefined fuzzy 
states had a degree of membership values. Contrary to other 
state machines (deterministic, non-deterministic and 
probabilistic), the transition function was interpreted as a 
fuzzy transition function. Also, the transitions between 
different states occurred based on the predefined fuzzy rules. 
In [39], the general definition of the fuzzy automaton was 
extended as shown in Equation 3. 
 
 ),,,,,( ωδ YPXSF =  (3) 
 
Where S is the finite set of fuzzy system states, S = 
{ms1,ms2,...,msk}, x is the finite set of dimensional input 
values, x = {x0,x1,...,xn}. δ is the fuzzy transition function, it 
is used to map the current state to the next state based on the 
finite set of inputs, δ : S × X → S. P shows the initial fuzzy 
state of F, P ∈ S. Y is the finite set of output dimensional 
vectors, Y = {Y0, Y1,..., Yk}. Finally, ω represents the output 
mapping function which is responsible for mapping the 
fuzzy states based on input values to the output set, ω: S× X 
→ Y. 
 
H. Fuzzy Automaton Detection Mechanism Architecture 
The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism consists of six 
major components. These components are listed as follows: 
• Setting up the finite fuzzy system states (S). 
• Setting up the initial system state (P), assumed to be 
in the normal state. 
• Defining the possible system input values (X). These 
values depend on which type of multi-step attack 
could be detected. The input values of the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism are presented as a set 
of system observations (i1, i2, in). 
• Defining the fuzzy state-transition function δ which is 
used to map the current system state to the next 
system state based on the observations, δ: S × X → S.  
• Defining the finite set of system outputs, Y = 
• {Y0,Y1,...,Yk}. 
• Defining the output mapping function (ω: S×X → Y ) 
which is responsible for mapping the fuzzy states 
based on input values to the output.  
The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism adapts the 
Fuzzy Interpolation based on the Vague Environment FRI 
method (FIVE) which was introduced by Kovacs in [40]-
[42]. The FRI (FIVE) method is used to simplify the rule 
definition and to interpolate the missing state-transition rules. 
Contrary to the classical reasoning methods, the FRI 
methods offer the interpolated conclusion even when some 
situations are not explicitly defined [43]. Fig.4 shows the 
general architecture of the fuzzy automaton detection 




Fig. 4  The Fuzzy Automaton Detection Mechanism Architecture 
 
The suggested fuzzy automaton based detection 
mechanism consisted of four system states S = {N, A, P, C}. 
These states are similar to those used in [44] which was 
defined as follows: 
• Normal (N): the system behavior is in normal mode, 
and there are no attempts to attack. 
• Attempt (A): there are different attempts to gather 
information about the system in legal ways (different 
probe tools are launched). 
• Prerequisites (P): malicious activity has commenced, 
and the multi-step attack is in the process of 
launching its final step of the attack. 
• Compromise (C): the multi-step attack has been 
completed successfully. The system is completely 
infected. 
Fig.5 presents the graph of the system states within the 
fuzzy automaton detection mechanism. The graph is fully 
connected to indicate that the transition (between states) may 




Fig. 5 System States of the Fuzzy Automaton Detection Mechanism 
 
The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism focuses on the 
initial steps of the multi-step attack to prevent the launch of 
any further attack steps. Suppose that, there is a multi-step 
attack with n+m steps to be launched successfully. The fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism focuses on predicting the 
multi-step attack penetrations within the period step (1) and 
step (n). Fig.6 presents the concentration intents of the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism. The multi-step attack may 
be detected early, because it built upon different preliminary 
phases that can be distinguished from one another. 
 
 
Fig. 6  The Concentration Intents of Fuzzy Automaton Detection 
Mechanism 
I. The Validation Methodology for The  Fuzzy Automaton 
Detection Mechanism 
In this subsection, the fuzzy automaton detection 
mechanism’s validation methodology is presented and 
discussed. The DARPA 2000 attack scenarios dataset 
LLDOS1.0 (inside) was used [23] to evaluate the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism in practice. It seems to be a 
proper benchmark for the multi-step attack. It consisted of 
different multi-step attack scenarios. One of the benefits of 
using DARPA 2000 dataset is that it contains a detailed truth 
table which allows for the obtained results to be checked. 
Moreover, most of the IDS detection approaches have 
applied this dataset for testing and evaluating processes [19]. 
This work extracts the first attack scenario which was a 
DDOS multi-step attack.  
According to the extracted DDOS multi-step attack 
scenario, the attacker aimed to install the DDOS multi-step 
attack on any computer within the target network. The attack 
was based on five steps [45]. It lasted three hours and was 
performed for these subnets 172.16.112.0/24, 
172.16.113.0/24, 172.16.114.0/24 and 172.16.115.0/24. 
Consequently, there were three hosts infected by the DDOS 
multi-step attack. These hosts were 172.16.115.20, 
172.16.112.50 and 172.16.112.10. Table I illustrates the five 




THE SEQUENCE STEPS OF THE DARPA ATTACK SCENARIO 
Step Name Time 
1 IP Sweep 09:45 - 09:52 
2 Sadmind 10:08 - 10:18 
3 Break-In 10:33 - 10:34 
4 Installation 10:50 
5 Launching 11:27 
 
• Step (1): The attacker sends a large number of 
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) echo 
requests in this sweep and waits for the echo replay to 
obtain the live IP addresses (hosts). 
• Step (2): The result of the step (1) is the list of live 
hosts. Every live host in the previous step was probed 
to define the hosts running the sadmind service. The 
sadmind investigation was applied using sadmind 
exploit software and ping command. 
• Step (3): The result of step (2) is the list of live hosts 
running the sadmind service. The break-in script was 
executed for every live host. Break-in script tries the 
sadmind remote to root access. During the period 
(10:33 to 10:34) there were 6 break-in attempts. 
• Step (4): The result of step (3) is the list of infected 
hosts (three hosts were infected). Herein, the break-in 
script executed the remote to root successfully. 
Therefore, the attacker had the required access to 
install the DDOS multi-step attack for these infected 
hosts. 
• Step (5): The attacker launched the DDOS multi-step 
attack using TELNET login. 
The simulated DDOS multi-step attack scenario lasted for 
a total of (11836 seconds). Table II presents the DDOS 
multi-step attack phases according to the simulation time. 
TABLE II 
THE PHASES DURING THE DDOS MULTI-STEP ATTACK 
Attack States Description Time In Seconds 
IP Sweep Step 1 of Attack 1500 - 1920 
Sadmind Step 2 of Attack 2880 - 3480 
Break-in Step 3 of Attack 3650 - 5200 
Installation Step 4 of Attack 5400 - 6500 
launching Step 5 of Attack 7620 - 11836 
 
The DARPA attack scenario dataset LLDOS1.0 (inside) 
was reformulated by extracting the values of the main 
feature and labeling the data according to the existing 
literature results [44], [45]. The fuzzy automaton detection 
mechanism’s fuzzy system states are defined as follows:  S = 
{N, A, P, C}. The initial state of the fuzzy automaton 
detection mechanism is assumed to be in the normal state 
(N). The N state indicates there are no attack attempts or 
privacy violations; the system is in normal mode. The A 
state indicates that there are some attempts to gather and 
probe for information using IP Sweep and sadmind. The P 
state indicates that malicious activity has been initiated by 
running the break-in and installation scripts. The C state 
indicates that the system has been completely infected; the 
multi-step attack has been launched successfully. 
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The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism’s input 
parameters (the set of observations) are the reformulated 
DARPA attack scenario. Due to a large number of extracted 
features and for the sake of simplification, one-eighth of the 
total number of features were selected as an input parameter. 
The relevant features were selected based on the intersection 
operation between the Gain Ratio (GR) algorithm, the 
Information Gain (IG) algorithm and the ReliefF (RF) 
algorithm [46]. Those features that fulfill the intersection 
criteria, as shown in Equation 4, were selected as the 
proposed detection mechanism’s input parameters. Table III 
shows the relevant input parameters for the fuzzy automaton 
detection mechanism. 
 
 RFIGGR ∩∩  (4) 
 
TABLE III 
THE RELEVANT INPUT PARAMETERS  
Parameter Description 
MSS Request In the connection between host a and host b, 
Maximum Segment Size (MSS) requested as a 
TCP option in the SYN packet opening the 
connection. 
Pure A2B The total number of ACK packets without 
payload and any SYNFIN/RST flags bits set in 
the connection from hots a and host b. 
Pure B2A The total number of ACK packets without 
payload and any SYNFIN/RST flags bits set in 
the connection from hots b and host a. 
Total bytes 
between A2B 
The total number of packets exchanged between 
the host a and host b. 
J. The State-transition Rules 
The state-transition rule-base, which is extracted from the 
expert heuristic, is necessary to implement the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism. One efficient tool for 
shaping the expert heuristic to fuzzy rules is the fuzzy 
declarative language [47]. It provides a simple structure for 
defining the state-transition rule-base size in a humanly 
readable form, closely resembling the original verbal form. 
Regarding the fuzzy declarative language, there are two 
conditions used to define the state transition rule-base: 
• Each rule-base should have a unique name. 
• The name of the rule-base must be the same as 
the name it's consequent. 
It is worth mentioning that, in the classical reasoning 
methods, the size of the state-transition rule-base grows 
exponentially with the number of the inputs (observations). 
For this reason, the proposed detection mechanism adapts 
the FRI, as it can effectively reduce the size of the state-
transition rule-base. The fuzzy automaton detection 
mechanisms have continuous states which are presented as a 
vector of membership values. These states were defined in 
the fuzzy declarative language as follow: 
 
Universe "Normal State" 
Description "The Degree of Normal State"  
       "Low"  0 0 
       "High" 1 1 
End 
Universe "Attempt State" 
Description "The Degree of Attempt State "  
       "Low"  0 0 
       "High" 1 1 
End 
Universe "Prerequisite State" 
Description "The Degree of Prerequisite State "  
       "Low"  0 0 
       "High" 1 1 
End 
Universe "Compromise State" 
Description "The Degree of Compromise State "  
       "Low"  0 0 
       "High" 1 1 
End 
  
The application of the FRI methods is beneficial in the 
IDS application area [10]. Using FRI methods, expert 
knowledge can be used as the basis of fuzzy rules. In the 
suggested FRI fuzzy automaton detection mechanism, the 
rules are not strict; the expert can sort some of the known 
cases only. Most important cases and scenarios can be 
sufficiently defined by using the proposed fuzzy declarative 
language. The description contains the definition of ranges 
(as universes) and the rules (in the form of rule-based). The 
definition of the universes describes non-linear scaling on 
the considered input and output dimensions. Experts must 
define language symbols which may be similar to the 
domain specific terms. Therefore, the FRI method 
formalizes the expert knowledge to the form, which can be 
interpreted and evaluated automatically by the inference 
engine. Using the language symbols allows the results to 
more closely resemble the natural language equivalent. 
The universe definitions of the observations of the 
proposed detection mechanism are defined based on the 
expert knowledge and presented in the fuzzy declarative 
language as follows: 
 
Universe "Mss_Request" 
"VSmall"   1 1987 
"Small"      2200 2700 
"Medium"  3200 5350 
"Large"      6500 8000 
End 
 
Universe "Pure_A2B " 
"VSmall"   0 31 
"Small"      31 69 
"Medium"  161 69 
"Large"      2430 616 
"VLarge"   8845 2430 
End 
 
Universe "Pure_B2A " 
"Low"   0 380 




Universe "Total_A2B " 
"Small"   1 8400 
"Large"   8400 17693 
End 
 
The state-transition rule-bases were defined based on 
expert knowledge. Fourteen state transition rules were 
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constructed. For example, the attempt state has five rule 





"Mss_Requested" is "Medium" and "Pure_A2B" is "Medium"  
end  
Rule 
"High"  when 




















"Mss_Requested" is "Large" and "Pure_A2B" is "VSmall" 
 end  
Rule 
"High" when 
"Mss_Requested" is "Medium" and "Pure_A2B" is "Small" and 


















"Mss_Requested" is " VLarge " and "Pure_A2B" is "Medium"  
end  
Rule 
"High"  when 




"Mss_Requested" is "VLarge" and "Pure_A2B" is "Large"  








"Mss_Requested" is "Small" 
 end 
 End 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
According to the way, as the FRI (FIVE) method 
calculates the conclusion, the evaluation process of rule 
bases can be described in bottom-up manner. In the first step, 
the inference engine calculates the observations’ distances 
from the defined symbols on the given universes. 
Subsequently, the rules’ distances are evaluated. In the 
considered configuration, the rule’s distance is the 
normalized Euclidean norm of the included symbol distances. 
The measure of the rule-base was obtained by the Shepard 
interpolation (inverse distance weighting) of the rule 
distances and their consequent values. The simulation 
environment can be accessed through [48]. 
The proposed detection mechanism generated intelligible 
results due to its fuzzy nature, subsequently allowing the 
degree of the system state to be determined and for the 
system to be in more than one state at the same time. Table 
IV presents the proposed detection mechanism’s output 
response in case of intrusion instances. Unlike DFSM and 
HMMs, the system states within the proposed detection 
mechanism are presented as a vector of membership values. 
This could benefit administrators because it helps them to 
understand the current security status and to mitigate future 
risks by forecasting the upcoming system state. 
TABLE IV 
THE OUTPUT RESPONSE OF THE PROPOSED MECHANISM 
Input Parameters 
 Instance 1 Instance 2 Instance 3 
Mss Request 4200 6300 3869 
Pure A2B 110 96 141 
Pure B2A 614 750 688 
Total A2B 10536 9365 12369 
The Proposed Detection Method Output 
 Output 1 Output 2 Output 3 
Normal 0.270791 0.085362 0.126221 
Attempt 0.919518 0.212365 0.932641 
Prerequisite 0.446831 0.926831 0.482133 
Compromise 0.157381 0.357381 0.198752 
 
The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism was tested and 
evaluated in the following durations of the DDOS multistep 
attack: (15-1062 seconds), (1800-2786 seconds), (37505191 
seconds) and (8210-10342 seconds). These durations were 
chosen to verify the performance of the fuzzy automaton 
detection mechanism in order to detect the DDOS multi-step 
attack in its early stages before it posed a severe risk. The 
fuzzy automaton detection mechanism was evaluated using 
5639 observations. The first detection was obtained by the 
fuzzy automaton detection mechanism at 1800 seconds, 2 
minutes before the attacker completes the works in step 1. 
The second detection was obtained at 3750 seconds, 24 
minutes before the attacker completes the works in step 3. 
The third detection was at 8210 seconds, 60 minutes before 
the attacker completes the works in step 5.  
Thus, early detection of the multi-step attack gives 
administrators time to take the necessary actions to mitigate 
any future risk from this type of attack. The IDS detection 
mechanism’s standard performance measure is typically 
performed using both the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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(ROC) and the confusion matrix [19], where the ROC shows 
the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity [49]. In 
keeping with the standard measure of most other IDS 
detection mechanisms, Fig. 7 shows the evaluation 
performance, with the ROC curve, for the fuzzy automaton 
detection mechanism states. 
Table V illustrates the confusion matrix obtained during 
the evaluation process. The results reflected that the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism obtained a 97.836% overall 
accuracy rate. Furthermore, the implemented experiments 
demonstrated that the fuzzy automaton detection mechanism 
was able to detect the DDOS multi-step attack within its 
early stages, using the DARPA dataset. Therefore, the early 
detection of the multi-step attack could be beneficial for the 
administrator to perform the required mitigation actions.  
For summarizing the results of the benchmark based tests, 
it can be stated, that the suggested FRI fuzzy automaton 
based IDS could be a promising mechanism for detecting 
multi-step attacks. The FRI fuzzy automaton based detection 
mechanism can be characterized by the following key points: 
• The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism offers the 
system states as a vector of membership values. 
• Unlike the DFSM, the system can be in more than 
one state at the same time, thereby allowing the fuzzy 
automaton detection mechanism to follow more than 
one path of system states changes. 
• Adapting the FRI (FIVE) method offers interpolated 
results even when lacking knowledge-based 
representation. In other words, The FRI (FIVE) 
method interpolates the results even when some of 
the state transition rules are missing. 
• The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism produces 
verbal detection results which can be more easily 
understood by administrators. 
• The fuzzy system extends the binary decision to the 
continuous space, smoothing the boundaries and 
offering a solution to the boundary problem in 
addition to generating more comprehensible results.  
• The fuzzy automaton detection mechanism can detect 
the DDOS multi-step attack within its early stages, 
using the DARPA dataset. Thus, early detection 
could help the administrator mitigate this type of 
attack. 
• The proposed detection mechanism’s strength is 
based on combining the fuzzy automaton and FRI 
based reasoning. Thus, the fuzzy system effectively 
smooths the decision boundary between normal and 
intrusion traffics, avoiding the binary decision. And 
the FRI based implementation is eliminating the need 


































The main characteristics of the proposed FRI fuzzy 
automaton IDS and the other state machine detection 
mechanisms are compared on Table VI. The proposed FRI 
fuzzy automaton IDS eliminates the boundary decision 
TABLE V 
THE CONFUSION MATRIX OF THE EVALUATION PROCESS 
 Normal Attempt Prerequisite Compromise Overall Observations Precision 
Normal 1045 2 2 0 1049 99.619% 
Attempt 13 985 8 0 1006 97.913% 
Prerequisite 0 58 1312 1 1371 95.697% 
Compromise 0 0 38 2175 2213 98.283% 
Truth Overall 1058 1045 1360 2176 5639  




Fig. 7  The ROC Curve for The Fuzzy Automaton Detection States. 
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problem, which is considered as a constant challenge 
because in real situation there are no clear boundaries 
between the normal and intrusion traffics. Also, 
implementing the FRI (FIVE) method instead of the classical 
reasoning methods for the reasoning part helps to reduce the 
total number of state-transition rules (simplification) and 
offers interpolated results even if the knowledge 
representation is incomplete. 
TABLE VI 
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System 
State 











This paper has introduced a novel method for detecting 
multi-step attacks by combining the Fuzzy Interpolation, 
based on the Vague Environment (FIVE) FRI reasoning, 
with the fuzzy automaton. The strength of fuzzy automaton 
is derived from two paradigms, the theory of automata and 
the fuzzy system. The reasoning part of the proposed 
detection mechanism adopts the FRI (FIVE) method instead 
of the classical reasoning methods. This decreases the total 
number of the intrusion state transition fuzzy rules needed to 
be defined (simplification) and also offers interpolated 
results even when the knowledge representation is 
incomplete. The state-transition rule-base was defined using 
an open source fuzzy declarative language. This provides a 
simple way for defining the state-transition rule-base in a 
humanly readable form, which is closely resembling the 
original verbal form.  
The experiments applied on a multi-step attack 
benchmark dataset are demonstrated, that the proposed 
detection mechanism can achieve an acceptable overall 
detection rate. It was able to successfully detect the multi-
step attack within the test-bed environment at an early stage 
of the attack. One of the main benefits of the proposed 
detection method is its ability to present the system states, as 
a vector of membership values. It could also extend the 
binary decision to the continuous space which smooths the 
boundaries and offers a solution to the boundary problem. 
Moreover, the proposed detection method allows the system 
to be in more than one state at the same time. Consequently, 
the fuzzy automaton detection mechanism could be a 
suitable detection mechanism for detecting multi-step attacks 
at their early stage, before they cause a serious risk and harm. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The described article was carried out as part of the EFOP-
3.6.1-16-00011 “Younger and Renewing University – 
Innovative Knowledge City – institutional development of 
the University of Miskolc aiming at intelligent 
specialization” project implemented in the framework of the 
Szechenyi 2020 program. The European Union supports the 
realization of this project, co-financed by the European 
Social Fund. 
REFERENCES 
[1] C Yuan. Research on multi-step attack detection method based on 
GCT. Jilin University, Jilin, China, 2010. 
[2] Yanxue Zhang, Dongmei Zhao, and Jinxing Liu. The application of 
baum-welch algorithm in multistep attack. The Scientific World 
Journal, 2014. 
[3] Kaspersky. The cost of ddos attacks. , Kaspersky, B2B International, 
2017.  
[4] Samaneh Rastegari, M Iqbal Saripan, and Mohd Fadlee A Rasid. 
Detection of denial of service attacks against domain name system 
using neural networks. In Proceedings of the World Congress on 
Engineering, Vol I WCE 2010, June 30 - July 2, 2010, London, U.K. 
[5] Salem Benferhat, Tayeb Kenaza, and Aicha Mokhtari. A naive bayes 
approach for detecting coordinated attacks. In Annual IEEE 
International Computer Software and Applications Conference, 
pages 704–709. IEEE, 2008. 
[6] Can Chen and BQ Yan. Network attack forecast algorithm for 
multistep attack. Computer Engineering, 5(37):172–174, 2011. 
[7] Chih-Fong Tsai, Yu-Feng Hsu, Chia-Ying Lin, and Wei-Yang Lin. 
Intrusion detection by machine learning: A review. Expert Systems 
with Applications, 36(10):11994–12000, 2009.  
[8] Mouhammd Alkasassbeh, Ghazi Al-Naymat, Ahmad BA Hassanat, 
and Mohammad Almseidin. Detecting distributed denial of service 
attacks using data mining techniques. International Journal of 
Advanced Computer Science and Applications, 7(1), 2016. 
[9] Mohammad Almseidin, Maen Alzubi, Szilveszter Kovacs, and 
Mouhammd Alkasassbeh. Evaluation of machine learning algorithms 
for intrusion detection system. In Intelligent Systems and Informatics 
(SISY), 2017 IEEE 15th International Symposium on, pages 000277– 
000282. IEEE, 2017.  
[10] M. Almseidin and S. Kovacs. Intrusion detection mechanism using 
fuzzy rule interpolation. Journal of Theoretical and Applied 
Information Technology, 96(16):5473–5488, 2018. 
[11] R Shanmugavadivu and N Nagarajan. Network intrusion detection 
system using fuzzy logic. Indian Journal of Computer Science and 
Engineering (IJCSE), 2(1):101–111, 2011. 
[12] Xuejiao Liu, Debao Xiao, Ting Gu, Hui Xu, et al. Scenario 
recognition based on collaborative attack modeling in intrusion 
detection. In Proceedings of the International MultiConference of 
Engineers and Computer Scientists, volume 1, 2008. 
[13] Guy Helmer, Johnny Wong, Mark Slagell, Vasant Honavar, Les 
Miller, and Robyn Lutz. A software fault tree approach to 
requirements analysis of an intrusion detection system. Requirements 
Engineering, 7(4):207– 220, 2002. 
[14] Yanxin Wang, Smruti Ranjan Behera, Johnny Wong, Guy Helmer, 
Vasant Honavar, Les Miller, Robyn Lutz, and Mark Slagell. Towards 
the automatic generation of mobile agents for distributed intrusion 
detection system. Journal of Systems and Software, 79(1):1–14, 2006. 
[15] Fred eric Cuppens, Fabien Autrel, Alexandre Miege, Salem 
Benferhat, et al. Recognizing malicious intention in an intrusion 
detection process. In HIS, pages 806–817, 2002. 
[16] Ashvin Alagiya, Hiren Joshi, and Ashish Jani. Performance analysis 
and enhancement of utm device in local area network. International 
Journal of Modern Education and Computer Science, 5(10):43, 2013.  
[17] Do-hyeon Lee, Doo-young Kim, and Jae-il Jung. Multi-stage 
intrusion detection system using hidden markov model algorithm. In 
Information Science and Security, 2008. ICISS. International 
Conference on, pages 72–77. IEEE, 2008.  
[18] Dirk Ourston, Sara Matzner, William Stump, and Bryan Hopkins. 
Applications of hidden markov models to detecting multi-stage 
network attacks. In System Sciences, 2003. Proceedings of the 36th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on, pages 10–pp. IEEE, 
2003.  
[19] Joel Branch, Alan Bivens, Chi-Yu Chan, Taek Kyeun Lee, and 
Boleslaw K Szymanski. Denial of service intrusion detection using 
time-dependent deterministic finite automata. In Proc. Graduate 
Research Conference, pages 45–51, 2002. 
585
[20] Juan J Flores, Anastacio Antolino, Juan M Garcia, and Felix 
Calderon Solorio. Hybrid network anomaly detection–learning hmms 
through evolutionary computation — Iconcept Press Ltd., 2012. 
[21] Mrs. Manisha Bharati and Santosh Lomte. A survey on hidden 
Markov model (hmm) based intention prediction techniques. 
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications, 
6(1):167–172, 2016. 
[22] Shrijit S Joshi and Vir V Phoha. Investigating hidden Markov models 
capabilities in anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 43rd annual 
Southeast regional conference-Volume 1, pages 98–103. ACM, 2005.  
[23] DARPA Datasets. Mit lincoln laboratory, darpa intrusion detection 
evaluation data sets, 2000. 
[24] Nagaraju Devarakonda, Srinivasulu Pamidi, V Valli Kumari, and A 
Govardhan. Integrated Bayes network and hidden Markov model for 
host-based ids. International Journal of Computer Applications, 
41(20), 2012.  
[25] Stephen D Bay, Dennis Kibler, Michael J Pazzani, and Padhraic 
Smyth. The uci kdd archive of large data sets for data mining 
research and experimentation. ACM SIGKDD explorations 
newsletter, 2(2):81–85, 2000. 
[26] AS Aneetha and S Bose. A probabilistic approach for intrusion 
detection system-fomc technique. In Advanced Computing (ICoAC), 
Sixth International Conference on pages 178–183. IEEE, 2014. 
[27] Nagaraju Devarakonda, Srinivasulu Pamidi, V Valli Kumari, and A 
Govardhan. Intrusion detection system using bayesian network and 
hidden markov model. Procedia Technology, 4:506–514, 2012. 
[Online]. Available:  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.protcy.2012.05.081. 
[28] Uttam Adhikari, Thomas H Morris, and Shengyi Pan. Applying 
nonnested generalized exemplars classification for cyber-power 
event and intrusion detection. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 
2016.  
[29] IBM. Behavior modeling with state machine and activity diagrams. 
KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, 2008. 
[30] Mor Vered. Finite state machines. Benson Idahosa University, 2008. 
[31] John E Hopcroft, Rajeev Motwani, and Jeffrey D Ullman. Automata 
theory, languages, and computation. International Edition, 24, 2006. 
[32] R Sekar, Mugdha Bendre, Dinakar Dhurjati, and Pradeep Bollineni. 
A fast automaton-based method for detecting anomalous program 
behaviors. In sp, page 0144. IEEE, 2001. 
[33] J. Treurniet. A finite state machine algorithm for detecting TCP 
anomalies: An examination of the 1999 DARPA intrusion detection 
evaluation data set. Defense R&D Canada-Ottawa, 2005. 
[34] Zong-Fen Han, Jian-Ping Zou, Hai Jin, Yan-Ping Yang, and Jian-Hua 
Sun. Intrusion detection using adaptive time-dependent finite 
automata. In Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 2004. Proceedings 
of 2004 International Conference on, volume 5, pages 3040–3045. 
IEEE, 2004. 
[35] Giovanni Vigna and Richard A Kemmerer. Netstat: A network-based 
intrusion detection approach. In Computer Security Applications 
Conference, 1998. Proceedings. 14th Annual, pages 25–34. IEEE, 
1998.  
[36] A Gemona, I Duncan, and A Miller. Nemesi: Using a tcp finite state 
machine against tcp syn flooding attacks. University of St Andrews, 
2006. 
[37] Rahul Kumar Singh and Ajay Guide Kumar. Conversion of Fuzzy 
Regular Expressions to Fuzzy Automata using the Follow Automata. 
Ph.D. thesis, Thapar University, 2014. 
[38] Mansoor Doostfatemeh and Stefan C Kremer. New directions in 
fuzzy automata. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 
38(2):175– 214, 2005.  
[39] Szilveszter Kovacs, David Vincze, Marta Gacsi, Adam Miklosi, and 
Peter Korondi. Ethologically inspired robot behavior implementation. 
In Human System Interactions (HSI), 4th International Conference 
on, IEEE, pages 64–69, 2011.  
[40] Szilveszter Kovacs. New aspects of interpolative reasoning. In 
Proceedings of the 6th. International Conference on Information 
Processing and Management of Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based 
Systems, Granada, Spain, pages 477–482, 1996. 
[41] Szilveszter Kovacs and László Kóczy. The use of the concept of 
vague environment in approximate fuzzy reasoning. Fuzzy Set 
Theory and Applications, Tatra Mountains Mathematical 
Publications, Mathematical Institute Slovak Academy of Sciences, 
Bratislava, Slovak Republic, 12:169–181, 1997. 
[42] Szilveszter Kovacs and László Kóczy. Approximate fuzzy reasoning 
based on interpolation in the vague environment of the fuzzy rule 
base. In Intelligent Engineering Systems, Proceedings, IEEE 
International Conference on, pages 63–68. IEEE, 1997.  
[43] Szilveszter Kovacs. Fuzzy rule interpolation. In Encyclopedia of 
Artificial Intelligence, pages 728–733. IGI Global, 2009. 
[44] Alireza Shameli Sendi, Michel Dagenais, Masoume Jabbarifar, and 
Mario Couture. Real-time intrusion prediction based on optimized 
alerts with hidden Markov model. JNW, 7(2):311–321, 2012. 
[45] Andre Arnes, Fredrik Valeur, Giovanni Vigna, and Richard A Kem-
merer. Using hidden Markov models to evaluate the risks of 
intrusions. In International Workshop on Recent Advances in 
Intrusion Detection, pages 145–164. Springer, 2006. [Online]. 
Available:  https://doi.org/10.1007/11856214_8 
[46] Opeyemi Osanaiye, Haibin Cai, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Ali 
Dehghantanha, Zheng Xu, and Mqhele Dlodlo. Ensemble-based 
multifilter feature selection method for ddos detection in cloud 
computing. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and 
Networking, 2016(1):130, 2016.. 
[47] Imre Piller, David Vincze, and Szilveszter Kovacs. Declarative 
language for behaviour description. In Emergent Trends in Robotics 
and Intelligent Systems, pages 103–112. Springer, 2015.  [Online]. 
Available:  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10783-7_11. 
[48] Imre Piller. The simulation environment. http://mat76.mat.uni-
miskolc. hu/∼imre/fbdl/simulator.html. 
[49] Aleksandar Lazarevic, Vipin Kumar, and Jaideep Srivastava. 
Intrusion detection: A survey. In Managing Cyber Threats, pages 19–
78. Springer, 2005. 
 
 
586
